Using a general equilibrium model in which people can choose to be either producers or predators, this paper shows that, if the technology of predation is sufficiently effective, then having a "king", who can enforce a collective choice to allocate resources to secure producers' claims to their product, is better for everyone, including both producers and potential predators, than not having a king, even though the king maximizes the consumption of a ruling elite. This result obtains because a more effective technology of predation both makes the social value of deterring predation larger and constrains the proprietary state more tightly.
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To answer this question the paper compares the welfare of producers in a hypothetical isolated society in anarchy with the welfare of producers in a hypothetical state whose only function is to enforce a collective choice to allocate resources to guarding against internal predators, who otherwise would appropriate the product of the producers. This comparison focuses on the tension between the primary biblical and Hobbesian justiÞcation for the state and the biblical warning that the state will tax and spend to beneÞt a ruling elite. To anticipate what we Þnd, the analysis shows that whether the Hobbesian position or the anarchist position is correct -that is, whether producers in this experiment are better off with a state or in anarchy -depends on the effectiveness of the technology of predation. 
A Digression on the Other Biblical Reason for Wanting a State
The Israelites also want to king to "Þght our battles". It is easy to understand why.
Because a state can enforce a collective choice to allocate resources to conßict with other societies, societies with states are likely to be able to subjugate societies without states.
As a result, assuming that the citizenry both values subjugating other societies and dreads being subjugated by another society more than it fears being exploited by its own king, the citizenry is likely to perceive itself to be better off with a state to "Þght our battles" than without a state. This conclusion provides a sufficient reason for why almost all societies that have made the transition from hunting and gathering to settled agriculture and industry seem to have reached the same conclusion as the Israelites that having a king is on balance better than not having a king. In a world of conßict among societies the formation of states is readily explicable as an equilibrium in which the dominant strategy of the citizenry of each society, taking as given the decisions of the citizenries of other societies to form or not 3 In contrast to the biblical story, it is possible that some states had their historical origin in a strong group taking for itself the power to tax and to spend without the consent of the citizenry. Although the biblical story highlights the dilemma created by the ability of the state to exploit its citizens, the question of whether producers are better off with a state or in anarchy is interesting and relevant regardless of the historical origin of the state.
to form states, is to form a state.
This conclusion, however, does not imply that the average citizen of the average state is better off in a world of states than he (or she) would be in a world without states. In a conßictual equilibrium in which all societies have formed states, states use their power to tax and to spend to increase the allocation of resources to conßict among societies. For this reason, and because conßict can be violent and destructive, if states existed only to "Þght our battles", then the average citizen of the average state surely would be worse off in a world of states than he would be in a world without states. This conclusion obtains even though forming a state is a dominant strategy for the citizenry. Furthermore, this conclusion would obtain even if states did not tax and spend to beneÞt ruling elites.
Of course, actual states do not exist only to "Þght our battles". On the contrary, the state's ability to enforce collective choices about resource allocation and income distribution offers many potential beneÞts for its citizens, including the beneÞt on which this paper focuses, which is securing producers' claims to their product. This observation suggests that, despite the fact that states increase the allocation of resources to conßict among societies, the citizenry can be better off with a state than in anarchy. This paper begins to explore this possibility by focusing on one primary function of the state, the enforcing of a collective choice to allocate resources to guarding against internal predators.
Overview of the Analysis
Consider a simple general-equilibrium model of a closed society with a large number of identical people. These people choose to be either producers or predators according to which activity is more lucrative. Predators are people who produce nothing, but live by appropriating the product of the producers.
The possibility that some people choose to be predators causes producers to allocate resources to guarding against predators.
4 Guarding includes all actions that are costly but have the effect of decreasing the fraction of production that predators appropriate. Examples of ways of guarding against predators include the locating of production in inconvenient but secure places, the production of things that are harder for predators to appropriate, the installation of locks, the building of walls, the hiring of private security guards, and the organizing of a police force. For simplicity, the model focuses on the total amount of resources allocated to guarding, abstracting from different ways of guarding.
5
The analysis begins by considering the allocation of resources to guarding against predators, and people's resulting choices to be producers or predators, in anarchy. In this context anarchy simply means that producers or small subsets of producers individually choose the amount of resources to allocate to guarding. According to this deÞnition anarchy precludes the enforcement of collective choices either by a state or by informal social controls. In other words, the present paper follows Hobbes in implicitly assuming that a state is necessary, as well as sufficient, to enforce collective choices. 6 In the present context the important in which people decide whether to be producers or predators and in which producers also decide how much time and effort to put into guarding against predators. Usher (1989; also 1992 , Chapter IV) introduced a proprietary state into this model. Usher did not ask whether producers are better off with a proprietary state than under anarchy.
5 Although the analysis does not explicitly consider the apprehension and punishment of predators, it could be extended to allow for apprehension and punishment. The apprehension and punishment of predators would not directly decrease the ability of predators to appropriate the product of producers, but apprehension and punishment by decreasing the expected utility of predators would make the choice to be a predator less attractive. Göran Skogh and Charles Stuart (1982) who enforces a collective choice to allocate resources to guarding against internal predators to be a Pareto improvement over anarchy.
Anarchy: Individual Choice of the Amount of Guarding
This section abstracts from both the state and the ruling elite. In this condition of anarchy each person potentially has to make two choices.
First, each person must choose whether to be a producer or a predator. In making this choice each person takes as given his (or her) potential consumption as a producer or as a predator. Let R denote the ratio of predators to producers. The fraction of people who choose to be predators is R/(1 + R), and the fraction of people who choose to be producers
Second, if a person chooses to be a producer, then he must allocate his resources between production of consumables and guarding against predators. In anarchy producers, or small subsets of producers, make this choice individually, taking the choices of other people to 8 Grossman and Suk Jae Noh (1990, 1994) and Grossman (1995) develop other models in which a Laffer curve constrains a proprietary state. These papers also contain references to earlier literature that develops the proprietary view of the state. In practice, a proprietary state can face a credibility constraint and/or a political constraint as well as a Laffer curve. For relevant analysis see, for example, Noh (1990, 1994) , Usher (1992, Chapter IV) , and Avner Greif et al. (1994) . The credibility constraint reßects the need for the state's policies to be intertemporally consistent. The political constraint reßects the ability of a maltreated citizenry to depose an incumbent ruling elite. The present paper abstracts from both the credibility constraint and the political constraint.
be either predators or producers as given. Let G denote the ratio of the resources that a producer allocates to guarding against predators to the resources that he allocates to the production of consumables. Each identical producer makes the same choice of G.
Assume that each person has an endowment of Ω units of resources. Further, to simplify the analysis of the choice between being a predator and a producer, assume that with each unit of resources a producer can produce one unit of consumables. Each producer actually
produces Ω/(1 + G) units of consumables, equal to the product of his endowment and the fraction of his endowment that he allocates to the production of consumables.
Let Y denote per capita production of consumables, which equals the product of the fraction of people who choose to be producers and the production of each producer. Thus, we have
Let p denote the nonnegative fraction of his own production that a producer appropriates. Predators appropriate the nonnegative fraction 1 − p. 9 Appealing to a random matching story, assume that the larger is the ratio of predators to producers the more frequently will each producer encounter a predator. Also, assume that the larger is the ratio of resources that a producer allocates to guarding against predators to the production that has to guard the less successful will the predators be in each encounter. Thus, p depends negatively on the ratio of predators to producers, R, and positively on the guarding ratio,
G.
To incorporate this story into the analysis in a simple and tractable way, assume that
, where θ > 0.
The parameter θ in equation (2) determines the effectiveness of predators in appropriating consumables for given values of R and G.
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Let C denote the consumption of a producer. Allowing for the fraction of resources allocated to guarding against predators and for the fraction of consumables appropriated by predators, we have
With individual choice of the amount of guarding each producer chooses G to maximize C, taking R as given. To analyze this choice problem we substitute equation (2) into equation (3) and calculate the value of G that satisÞes the condition dC/dG = 0. This condition implies that in anarchy each producer chooses G such that
In Figure 1 the concave positively-sloped locus represents equation (4).
Let D denote the consumption of a predator. To calculate D, observe that predators appropriate (1 − p)Ω/(1 + G) units of consumables from each producer. Thus, assuming 10 Although equation (2) is easy to rationalize, it is a generic black box that conceals the process of predation, just as the standard generic production function conceals the process of production. Also, equation
(2) assumes, for simplicity, that for each producer p depends only on R and on his own guarding ratio.
We could extend the model to allow for a negative externality in guarding. For example, it is possible that, if your neighbors build high walls around their properties but you do not build a high wall around your property, then your property becomes a relatively easier target for burglars. In this case, for given values of R and a producer's own guarding ratio, for each producer p would be negatively related to the guarding ratio of other producers. It is easy to show that this effect would cause each producer in anarchy to choose a larger guarding ratio for any given value of R. The result would be a smaller, but still positive, equilibrium value of R. Importantly, because in anarchy producers still take R as given, a negative externality in guarding would not change the conclusion that the state, taking into account the deterrent effect of guarding, would choose to enforce an even larger guarding ratio.
that each predator obtains an equal share of what predators appropriate, D equals the product of (1 − p)Ω/(1 + G) and the ratio of producers to predators. Accordingly, we have
To decide whether to be a producer or a predator, each person compares the values of C and D. In taking as given his potential consumption as a producer or as a predator, each person in effect takes as given the choices by other people to be producers or predators, as reßected in R, and the choice by producers to allocate productive resources between production and guarding against predators, as reßected in G. He knows that, if he chooses to be a producer, then he will choose the same value of G as other producers.
Substituting equation (2) into equations (3) and (5), and assuming that R is Þnite,
we calculate that D/C equals θ/G. Accordingly, if G equals θ, then every person is indifferent between being a producer or a predator, and, if G were larger than θ, then every person would prefer to be a producer. (The ratio D/C is undeÞned for G smaller than θ.) Thus, in anarchy the choices to be a producer or a predator are such that
In Figure 1 the L shaped locus represents equation (6).
Solving equations (4) and (6) simultaneously, we Þnd that the equilibrium conÞguration of choices in anarchy, as shown in Figure 1 , is
Equation (7) says that, with individual choice of the amount of guarding, both the guarding ratio and the ratio of predators to producers are equal to θ. A ratio of predators to producers equal to θ is just sufficient to cause producers to choose G equal to θ, a choice that leaves each person indifferent between being a producer and a predator. Equation (7) also implies that the fraction θ/(1 + θ) of the people choose to be predators and that producers allocate the fraction θ/(1 + θ) of their resources to guarding against predators. 11 From equation (2), with R = G = θ, p equals 1/(1 + θ).
Substituting R = G = θ and p = 1/(1 + θ) into equations (1), (3), and (5), we obtain
Equation (8) implies that per capita production of consumables is less than the potential per capita production of consumables, which is Ω. Equation (8) to as "the waste of labour when one man attempts to take property from another and the other is compelled to divert effort from production to defense."
Collective Choice of the Amount of Guarding
This section introduces a state that has the ability to tax producers. The ability to tax allows the state to enforce a collective choice of how much resources each producer should allocate to guarding against predators. This collective choice of G affords a strategic advantage because it can take into account both how each producer's allocation of resources 11 Although this model can determine the fractions of the people who choose to be producers and predators, because each person has the same resource endowment, this model cannot determine which of the people choose to be producers or predators. In Grossman and Kim (2000) a version of this model of anarchy in which some people are well endowed with productive resources and other people are poorly endowed with productive resources allows an equilibrium in which well endowed choose to be producers and poorly endowed people choose to be predators.
to guarding affects his value of p for a given ratio of predators to producers as well as how the amount of resources that all of the producers allocate to guarding affects the choices of people to be producers or predators.
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To enforce its collective choice of G, the state taxes the endowments of producers at rate t. In this context taxation means that the state compels each producer to allocate the fraction t of his endowment to something other than the production of consumables for his own consumption. Thus, with the state choosing the amount of guarding, the consumption of each producer, C, is
The model assumes, realistically, that the state is not able to tax predators.
To bring out the importance of a collective choice of guarding, this section abstracts from the ruling elite and assumes that the state acts as the agent of producers by maximizing C, the consumption of each producer. To maximize C the state would choose the lowest tax rate consistent with its choice of G. Hence, in this section the state sets the fraction t equal to the fraction G/(1 + G).
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Substituting t = G/(1+G) into equation (9), we see that equation (9) becomes identical to equation (3). Thus, with the state choosing the lowest tax rate consistent with its choice of G, a comparison of the values of C, as given by equation (9), and D, as given by equation (5), still leads to choices to be a producer or a predator such that R satisÞes equation (6).
12 In order to focus on the strategic advantage of a collective choice, the analysis abstracts from the possibility that collective choice might have a technological advantage. In reality some ways of guarding that can only be chosen collectively could be more efficient than other ways of guarding. Another possibility is increasing returns to scale in guarding.
Substituting equation (2), which determines the effect of G on p for a given R, and equation (6), which determines the effect of G on R, into equation (3), we Þnd that the state maximizes C by compelling each producer to allocate a fraction of his endowment to guarding such that
where θ * ≡ (1 + ²)θ, and where ² is an arbitrarily small positive number. From equation (6), θ * is the minimum feasible value of G for which R uniquely equals zero. Importantly, the ratio θ * /θ is close to one. Equation (10) says that, in this model, to maximize C the state would make and enforce a collective choice that each producer should allocate a fraction of his endowment to guarding against predators that is larger by a small amount than he would choose individually, just enough larger to deter all predation.
14 From equation (2), with R equal to zero p equals one.
Substituting R = 0, p = 1, and G = θ * into equations (1) and (3), we obtain
Comparing equations (8) and (11), we see that, with the state as the agent of producers making and enforcing a collective choice of the amount of guarding, per capita production of consumables is still less than potential per capita production of consumables. But, per capita production of consumables is larger than in anarchy. This improvement occurs because, by 14 The implication that with G equal to θ * every person would choose to be a producer requires the assumption that all people have the same endowment, Ω. In reality some people have smaller endowments and, hence, less lucrative production opportunities than others. In a more general analysis, although the state typically would choose a larger guarding ratio than producers would choose in anarchy, the state might not choose a large enough guarding ratio to deter all of the relatively poorly endowed people from choosing to be predators. Grossman (1998) analyzes collective choice of the guarding ratio in a version of this model in which some people are well endowed with productive resources and other people are poorly endowed with productive resources.
increasing G from θ to θ * , the state deters the fraction θ/(1 + θ) of the people from choosing to be predators, whose resources would be wasted. In addition, the ratio of Y and C as given by equation (11) to Y and C as given by equation (8), which quantiÞes the advantage of collective choice of the amount of guarding, is increasing in θ. This result implies that the more effective are predators in appropriating consumables the more valuable is the state's ability to deter people from choosing to be predators in mitigating the social cost of predation.
A Proprietary State
This section makes the analysis of the state more realistic by introducing a ruling elite and by assuming that, in taxing producers and in choosing the amount of guarding against predators, the state maximizes the consumption of the ruling elite rather than the consumption of each producer. Let E denote the consumption of the ruling elite, where, normalizing the population of producers and predators to one, we have
Equation (12) says that the consumption of the ruling elite equals the production of consumables less the consumption of producers and predators. 15 Substituting for Y from equation
(1), for C from equation (9), and for D from equation (5) into equation (12), we obtain
Equation (13) shows that for E to be positive t, the rate at which the state taxes the endowments of producers, must be larger than G/(1 + G), the fraction of resources that the state compels each producer to allocate to guarding against predators. The difference 15 This analysis takes the existence and composition of the ruling elite as given. The existence of a viable proprietary state implies that the ruling elite is small enough that in equilibrium E divided by the size of the ruling elite is at least as large as C. Given this condition being a member of the ruling elite is at least as lucrative as being a producer.
between t and G/(1 + G) is the fraction of the resources of producers that the state compels each producer to allocate1 to the production of consumables for the ruling elite.
With t not necessarily equal to G/(1 + G), to decide whether to be a producer or a predator, each person, taking G and R as given, compares the value of C, as given by equation (9) rather than equation (3), with the value of D, as given by equation (5).
Equation (5) assumes that predators appropriate the fraction 1 − p of the consumables produced either for the consumption of producers or for the consumption of the ruling elite. Substituting equation (2) into equations (9) and (5), we calculate that D/C equals θ/G(1 + G)(1 − t). Accordingly, if G(1 + G)(1 − t) were equal to θ, then every person would be indifferent between being a producer or a predator, and, if G(1 + G)(1 − t) is larger than θ, then every person chooses to be a producer. Thus, with a proprietary state the choices to be a producer or a predator are such that
Equation (14) implies that the higher is t the larger must be G for predation to be deterred. This result obtains because, as the state taxes producers but cannot tax predators, the higher is t the less lucrative is production relative to predation. If the state were to set t equal to G/(1 + G), then equation (14) would be identical to equation (6).
Substituting equation (2), which determines both the effect of G on p for a given R and the effect of R on p, and equation (14), which determines the effect of G on R, into equation (13), we Þnd that the state maximizes E by choosing G and t such that
According to equations (14) and (15) the state chooses a combination of a value of G that is just large enough and a value of t that is just small enough to make R uniquely equal to zero. Thus, to maximize E, just as to maximize C, the state chooses to deter all Next, we substitute p = 1 and R = 0 into equation (13), and we calculate the value of G that satisÞes the condition dE/dG = 0, given that t and G satisfy equation (15).
This condition implies that the state chooses G such that dt/dG = 1/(1 + G) 2 , where, from equation (15), we have dt/dG = θ * (1 + 2G)/G 2 (1 + G) 2 . Solving for G, we obtain
Comparing equation (16) with equation (10) we see that with the state maximizing E it compels producers to allocate more resources to guarding against predators than if it were maximizing C. This result obtains because maximizing E implies that t is larger than G/(1 + G), and because with t larger than G/(1 + G) deterrence requires a larger value of G than with t equal to G/(1 + G).
Equations (15) and (16) together imply that to maximize E the state chooses t such that (17)
Interestingly, as shown in Figure 2 , equation (17) implies that t is a quasi-convex function of θ, that t equals one at θ equal to zero, and that t asymptotically approaches one from below as θ goes to inÞnity. The minimum value of t, which is less than one, obtains at a positive value of θ, denoted θ 0 , where θ 0 = ( √ 2 − 1)/2.
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16 This analysis abstracts from the possibility that the proprietary state would allocate none of its tax revenue to guarding, simply free riding on the allocation of resources to guarding by individual producers. Mendoza (1999) derives conditions under which the state would choose to be a free rider. Mendoza also argues that these conditions are relevant in some countries.
17 In this model the tax rate that maximizes the consumption of the ruling elite approaches one as θ becomes either very small or very large because of the simplifying assumption that the people can avoid taxation only by choosing to be predators. In more general models in which people also can engage in other
This property that either a very large value of θ or a very small value of θ results in a high tax rate obtains for two reasons. First, as we have seen, maximizing the consumption of the ruling elite implies maximizing the difference between t and G/(1 + G), given that the combination of t and G is such as to deter all predation. Second, according to whether θ is large or small, the possibility of choosing to be a predator is a more or less attractive option. Thus, if θ is small, then a high tax rate, and a small amount of guarding against predators, is consistent with deterring all predation. At the other extreme, if θ is large, then a large value of G is necessary to deter all predation, and a high tax rate is necessary to enforce this choice of G.
Production and Consumption with a Proprietary State
We can now compare production and consumption in anarchy and with a proprietary state that enforces a collective choice to allocate resources to secure producers' claims to their product. With p = 1 and R = 0, substituting equations (16) and (17) into equation (13), we obtain
Equation (18) implies that the consumption of the ruling elite is a monotonically decreasing function of θ such that E equals Ω at θ equal to zero, and E asymptotically approaches zero from above as θ goes to inÞnity.
Substituting R = 0 and G = θ * + q θ * (1 + θ * ) from equation (16) into equation (1) we obtain
. nontaxable activities, like leisure or home production, or in which the survival probability of the incumbent ruling elite is a decreasing function of the tax rate, the tax rate still would be a quasi-convex function of θ with a minimum at a positive value of θ, but the tax rates associated with either very small or very large values of θ would be smaller than one.
As shown in Figure 3 , equation (19) implies that per capita production of consumables under a proprietary state is also a decreasing convex function of θ. Comparing equation (19) with equation (11), we see that, with the state maximizing the consumption of the ruling elite, because the amount of resources that the state compels producers to allocate to guarding is larger, per capita production of consumables is smaller than if the state were maximizing the consumption of each producer.
More interestingly, comparing equation (19) with equation (8), which gives per capita production of consumables in anarchy, we Þnd that, as shown in Figure 3 , if θ is larger than θ 1 , where θ 1 = ( √ 5 − 1)/2, then per capita production of consumables is larger with the state maximizing the consumption of the ruling elite than in anarchy. This result obtains because for larger values of θ the ability of the state to enforce the choice of enough guarding to deter all predation becomes increasingly important in mitigating the social cost of predation, even though by setting t higher than G/(1 + G) the proprietary state increases the cost of deterrence.
We turn now to our main concern, the consumption of producers with a proprietary state.
Given p = 1, substituting equation (17) into equation (9), we obtain
As shown in Figure 4 , equation (20) implies that with a proprietary state, C is a humpshaped function of θ such that C equals zero at θ equal to zero, C reaches a positive maximum at θ = θ 0 , and C asymptotically approaches zero from above as θ goes to inÞnity. Interestingly, with the state maximizing the consumption of the ruling elite the consumption of a producer is an increasing function of θ for small values of θ and becomes a decreasing function of θ only for large values of θ.
Comparing equation (20) 
. We Þnd that, as shown in Figure 4 , if θ is larger than θ 2 , then C is larger with the state maximizing the consumption of the ruling elite than both C and D would be in anarchy. In other words, if θ is sufficiently large, then having a "king" who can make and enforce a collective choice of the amount of guarding is better for everyone than not having a king, even though the king maximizes the consumption of a ruling elite. This result obtains both because for larger values of θ the ability of the state to enforce the choice of enough guarding to deter all predation becomes increasingly important and because for larger values of θ the ability of people to avoid taxation by choosing to be predators implies a tighter constraint on the proprietary state.
Summary
Having a state is advantageous because a state can enforce collective choices about resource allocation and income distribution. But, the state also can exploit its subjects by taxing and spending to beneÞt a ruling elite. Motivated by this observation this paper asked whether, as Hobbes claims, appropriative conßict under anarchy provides a sufficient reason for the citizenry to subject itself willingly to the state's power to tax and to spend.
To answer this question the paper developed a comparative analysis of the welfare of producers in a hypothetical isolated society in anarchy and in a hypothetical proprietary state whose only function is to enforce a collective choice to allocate resources to secure producers' claims to their product. The analytical framework was a simple general-equilibrium model in which people can choose to be either producers or predators. The assumed objective of the proprietary state is to maximize the consumption of the ruling elite.
The analysis revealed two critical ways in which the differences between the implications of anarchy and the implications of a proprietary state depend on the technology of predation.
First, because the state is able to enforce a collective choice to allocate resources to guarding against predators, the state can take into account the deterrent effect of guarding on the fraction of people who choose to be predators. The more effective is the technology of predation the more valuable is the state's ability to deter predation in mitigating the social cost of predation.
Second, the ability of people to avoid taxation by choosing to be predators rather than producers constrains the proprietary state. This constraint is tighter the more effective is the technology of predation. Furthermore, to mitigate this constraint the proprietary state allocates sufficient resources to guarding against predators to deter predation.
Taken together the effects of a more effective technology of predation both in increasing the social value of deterring predation and in constraining the proprietary state more tightly lead to the following result:
If the technology of predation is sufficiently good, then a proprietary state that can enforce a collective choice to allocate resources to secure producers' claims to their product is better than anarchy for everyone, including both producers and potential predators, even though the proprietary state maximizes the consumption of a ruling elite.
How good does the technology of predation actually have to be in order for a proprietary state to be Pareto superior to anarchy? The model analyzed in this paper has provided a sufficient condition for Pareto superiority in an isolated society. Importantly, the model abstracted from the role of the state in increasing the costly allocation of resources to conßict among societies. But, on the other side of the ledger the model also abstracted from the state's ability to effect more efficient ways of guarding, as well as from the state's ability to provide public goods that are unrelated to predation. In addition, in the model the only constraint on the proprietary state's exploitation of producers is the ability of people to avoid taxation by choosing to be predators. Realistically, producers also might be able to evade taxation or to avoid taxation by allocating resources either to leisure or to nontaxable production, and producers might be able to depose an exploitive ruling elite. Presumably, notwithstanding the effect of the state in increasing the cost of conßict among societies, the more ways in which the state beneÞts producers and the tighter that the actions or potential actions of producers constrain the policies of the proprietary state the easier it is for a proprietary state to be better than anarchy.
